Given a pair of graphs G 1 and G 2 and a vertex set of interest in G 1 , the vertex nomination problem seeks to find the corresponding vertices of interest in G 2 (if they exist) and produce a rank list of the vertices in G 2 , with the corresponding vertices of interest in G 2 concentrating, ideally, at the top of the rank list. In this paper we study the effect of an adversarial contamination model on the performance of a spectral graph embedding-based vertex nomination scheme. In both real and simulated examples, we demonstrate that this vertex nomination scheme performs effectively in the uncontaminated setting; adversarial network contamination adversely impacts the performance of our VN scheme; and network regularization successfully mitigates the impact of the contamination. In addition to furthering the theoretic basis of consistency in vertex nomination, the adversarial noise model posited herein is grounded in theoretical developments that allow us to frame the role of an adversary in terms of maximal vertex nomination consistency classes.
Introduction and background
Given graphs G 1 and G 2 and vertices of interest V * ⊂ V (G 1 ), the aim of the vertex nomination (VN) problem is to rank the vertices of G 2 into a nomination list with the corresponding vertices of interest concentrating at the top of the nomination list.
In recent years, a host of VN procedures have been introduced (see, for example, [13, 29, 25, 16, 36, 48] ) that have proven to be effective information retrieval tools in both synthetic and real data applications. Moreover, recent work establishing a fundamental statistical framework for VN has led to a novel understanding of the limitations of VN efficacy in evolving network environments [26] . Herein, we consider a general statistical model for adversarial contamination in the context of vertex nominationhere the adversary model can both randomly add or remove edges and/or vertices in the network-and we examine the effect of both this contamination and subsequent data regularization ( effectively removing outlier nodes) on VN performance. To motivate our mathematical and statistical results further, we first consider an illustrative real data example in Section 1.1 in which we demonstrate the following: A VN scheme that works effectively; network contamination adversely impacting the performance of our VN scheme; and network regularization successfully mitigating the impact of the contamination. Note that we will provide a more thorough background of the relevant literature after the motivating example in Section 1.2.
Motivating example
Consider the pair of high school friendship networks in [31] : The first, G 1 , has 156 nodes, each representing a student, and has two vertices adjacent if the two students made contact with each other at school in a given time period; the second, G 2 , has 134 vertices, again with each vertex representing a student, and has two vertices adjacent if the two students are friends on Facebook. There are 82 students appearing in both G 1 and G 2 , and we pose the VN problem here as follows: given a student-of-interest in G 1 , can we nominate the corresponding student (if they exist) in G 2 . We note here that the vertex nomination approach outlined below easily adapts to the multiple vertices of interest (v.o.i.) scenario (i.e., given students-of-interest in G 1 , can we nominate the corresponding students, if they exist, in G 2 )-and we will provide the necessary details for handling both single and multiple v.o.i. below.
In one idealized data setting, all students would appear in both graphs as this would potentially maximize the signal present in the correspondence of labels across graphs.
This bears itself out in the following illustrative VN experiment. Consider the following simple VN scheme, which we denote VN • GMM • ASE: Given vertex (or vertices) of interest v * in G 1 and seeded vertices S ⊂ V 1 ∩ V 2 (seeds here represent vertices whose identity across networks is known a priori), proceed as follows (see Section 4.1 for full detail):
1. Use Adjacency Spectral Embedding (ASE) [43] to separately embed G 1 and G 2 into a common Euclidean space R d ; 2. Solve the orthogonal Procrustes problem [39] to find an orthogonal transformation aligning the seeded vertices across graphs; use this transformation to align the embeddings of G 1 and G 2 in R d ; 3. Use model-based Gaussian mixture modeling (GMM; e.g., the R package MClust We can consider running the above procedure in the idealized data setting where we only consider the induced subgraphs of G 1 and G 2 containing the 82 common vertices across graphs (call these graphs G (i) 1 and G (i)
2 ), and we can also consider running the procedure in the setting where the 52 vertices in G 2 without matches across graphs are added to G (i) 2 as a form of contamination. These unmatchable vertices can have the effect of obfuscating the correspondence amongst the common vertices across graphs, and thus can diminish VN performance. Indeed, we see this play out in Figure 1 .
In Figure 1 , we plot the performance of VN•GMM•ASE averaged over nM C = 500 random seed sets of size s = 10. In the left figure, the x-axis shows the ranks in the nomination list and the y-axis shows the mean (± 2s.e.) number of vertices v ∈ G Reg. x=0.1, y=0
Reg. x=0.25, y=0
Reg. x=y=0.1
Affect of regularization on VN o GMM o ASE ).
Algorithm 1 Regularization via network trimming
Input: Graph G, x, y ∈ (0, 1), seed set S;
Rank the vertices in V (G) \ S by descending degree (ties are broken via averaging over ranks). For each vertex u in V (G) \ S, denote the rank via rk(u);
ASE at all levels, as for all x, the number of v.o.i. in G
1 with their corresponding v.o.i. ranked in the top x in the second graph is larger in (G
How can we mitigate the effect of the contamination in G 2 ? Network regularization is a natural solution, and we here consider as a regularization strategy the network analogue of the classical trimmed mean estimator. To wit, we consider the regularization procedure in Algorithm 1 inspired by the network trimming procedure in [15] ; see also the work in [24] for the impact of trimming regularization on random graph concentration.
Remark 1. The parameters x and y appearing in Algorithm 1 are unknown a priori, and to data-adaptively choose x and y, we sweep over possible values and choose the values of x and y that leads to the maximum network modularity in G via GM M • ASE clustering; i.e., embed G (x,y) 2 using ASE and cluster the embedding using a model-based GMM procedure. Given a clustering C, the modularity is defined as usual via
where |E| =the number of edges in G (x,y) 2
; A i,j is the i, j-th element of the adjacency
; and C i is the cluster containing vertex i in C.
In the left panel of Figure 2 , we plot the modularity of the GMM clustering in
as a function of x, y ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25}. Note that we average the modularity values over nM C = 500 seed sets of size s = 10 (the same seed sets as used in Figure 1 ). The color indicates the value of the modularity, with darker red indicating lower values and lighter yellow-to-white indicating larger values. From the figure, we can see that modularity is maximized when y = 0 (i.e., no large degree vertices trimmed) and x ≈ 0.05-0.1. We note that this trimming process can cut core vertices as well as junk vertices, and core vertices cut from G 2 can never be recovered via VN • GMM • ASE. This is demonstrated in the right panel of Figure 2 , where the horizontal asymptotes for each trimming value indicates the maximum number of core vertices that are recoverable after regularization.
In Figure 1 , we see the effect of regularization play out. Indeed, mean VN • GMM • ASE performance in the regularized setting increases versus in the contaminated setting for (x, y) = {(0.075, 0), (0.1, 0), (0.25, 0)}, whereas mean regularized performance decreases for (x, y) = {(0.1, 0.1)}. From the right figure, we observe that mean performance in the (x, y) = {(0.075, 0), (0.1, 0), (0.25, 0)} regularized setting is significantly better than chance, while over-regularizing induces worse than chance performance (the pink line in Figure 1 panel b) . While over-regularizing can adversely affect performance, this data-adaptive regularization-while not fully recovering the performance of the idealized setting-nonetheless effectively mitigates the impact of the contamination on our VN • GMM • ASE algorithm. we plot the performance of VN • GMM • ASE averaged over nM C = 500 random seed sets of size s = 10.
In the left figure, the x-axis shows the ranks in the nomination list and the y-axis shows the mean (± 2s.e.) number of vertices v ∈ G Figure 1 shows performance of VN • GMM • ASE averaged over 500 randomly chosen seed sets of size 10. While performance, on the whole, increases with proper regularization, the story can vary wildly from seed set to seed set. To demonstrate this, we plot the performance of VN • GMM • ASE over two particular seed sets (out of the 500 total used in Figure 1 ) in Figure 3 . In the top panels, we plot performance in the setting of "bad" seeds; i.e., those seeds for which the regularization is unable to effectively mitigate the performance loss due to contamination. In the bottom panels, we plot performance in the setting of "good" seeds; i.e., those seeds for which the contamination negatively impacts performance, but subsequent regularization is able to effectively mitigate this performance loss. These two figures (and their respective chance normalizations in the right panels) point to the primacy of seed selection and of understanding what differentiates "good" versus "bad" seeds. While a full exploration of this is beyond the scope of the present text, this is an active area of our work.
The role of seeds

Background
In modern statistics and machine learning, graphs are a common way to take into account the complex relationships between data objects, and graphs have been used in applications across the biological (see, for example, [41, 7, 1, 30, 20, 32] ) and social sciences (see, for example, [34, 40, 19, 21] ). In addition to more traditional statistical inference tasks such as clustering [38, 37, 6, 33] , classification [46, 10, 1] , and estimation [5, 4, 43] , there has been significant work in more network-specific inference tasks such as graph matching [11, 17, 47] , and vertex nomination [29, 12, 16] .
Loosely speaking, the vertex nomination problem can be stated as follows: given graphs G 1 and G 2 and vertices of interest V * ⊂ V (G 1 ), rank the vertices of G 2 into a nomination list with the corresponding vertices of interest concentrating at the top of the nomination list (see Definition 4 for full detail). While vertex nomination has found applications in a number of different areas, such as social networks in [36] and data associated with human trafficking in [16] , there are relatively few results establishing the statistical properties of vertex nomination. In [16] , consistency is developed within the stochastic blockmodel random graph framework, where interesting vertices were defined via community membership. In [26] , the authors develop the concepts of consistency and Bayes optimality for a very general class of random graph models and a very general definition of what makes the v.o.i. interesting. In this paper, we further develop the ideas in [26] , with the aim of developing a theoretical regime in which to ground the notion of adversarial contamination in VN.
There has been significant recent attention towards better understanding the impact of adversarial attacks on machine learning methodologies (see, for example, [23, 8, 35, 14, 50] ). Herein, we define an adversarial attack on a machine learning algorithm to be a mechanism that changes the data distribution in order to negatively affect algorithmic performance; see Definition 13. From a practical standpoint, adversarial attacks model the very real problem of having data compromised; if an intelligent agent has access to the data and algorithm, the agent may want to modify the data or the algorithm to give the wrong prediction/inferential conclusion. Although there has been much work on adversarial modeling in machine learning, there has been less theory developed for adversarial attacks from a statistical perspective.
The adversarial framework we consider is similar to the model considered in [8] , and it is motivated by the example in the previous section in which the addition of the vertices without correspondences to G 2 negatively impacted VN performance.
Suppose that we are interested in performing vertex nomination on a graph pair, but an adversary randomly adds and deletes some edges and/or vertices in the second graph. For example, suppose we are trying to find influencers on Instagram by vertex matching to Facebook. An influencer that has knowledge of our procedure may attempt to make our algorithm fail in its nominations, perhaps by friending and de-friending people on Facebook. Even if our vertex nomination scheme was working well prior to encountering the adversary, it may not be after modification by the adversary.
However, if the adversary adds edges/vertices to a graph with some probability and deletes edges/vertices with another probability, it may be possible to partially recover the structure of the original graph by removing vertices with unusual degree behavior [15] . Such a modification is the graph analogue of the "trimmed mean" estimator [42] from classical statistics.
Empirically, if we assume the adversary is modifying the data randomly, can we still predict whether our VN scheme will perform well on the regularized graph? From a statistical standpoint, what can we say about the statistical consistency of our original vertex nomination rule? Our motivating example suggests that it may be possible to recover performance after regularization, but theory is needed both to explain why that may be the case and to properly frame the problem. Hence, to answer these questions, we further develop the theory in [26] to situate the notion of adversarial contamination within the idea of maximal consistency classes for a given VN rule (Section 2.1). In this framework, the goal of an adversary is to move a model out of a rule's consistency class, while regularization enlarges the consistency class to (hopefully) thwart the adversary.
While we are unable to rigorously establish this for the VN rule, VN
considered herein, we demonstrate with real and synthetic data examples that countering such an adversarial attack via network regularization can effectively ameliorate VN performance (Section 4).
Notation: Note that the following notation will be used throughout. For a positive integer k, we will let G k denote the set of k-vertex labled graphs, and we will let
Vertex Nomination and Consistency
We will now rigorously define the VN problem and consistency within the VN framework. Combined with the results on consistency classes in Section 2.1, this will allow us to provide a statistical basis for understanding adversarial attacks in VN.
As in our motivating work in [26] , we will situate our analysis of the VN problem in the very general framework of nominatable distributions.
Definition 2. For a given n, m ∈ Z > 0, the set of Nominatable Distributions of order (n, m), denoted N n,m , is the collection of all families of distributions of the following form
is a distribution on G n × G m parameterized by θ ∈ Θ satisfying:
.., u c } as the core vertices.
These are the vertices that are shared across the two graphs and imbue the model with a natural notion of corresponding vertices. from [26] .
Vertices in
∈ N n,m , and let W be a set satisfying
to W as an obfuscating set, and we let O W be the set of all such obfuscation functions.
In this framework, a VN scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 4.
(VN Scheme) Let n, m ∈ Z > 0, and for each g ∈ G m , u ∈ V (g), let
Let W be an obfuscating set and o ∈ O W be given. For a set A, let T A denote the set of all total orderings of the elements of A. A vertex nomination scheme is a function
, and we define r Φ :
then we require that for any
where
denotes the k-th element (i.e., the rank-k vertex) in the or-
We let V nm denote the set of all such VN schemes.
Remark 5. The consistency criterion, Eq. 1, models the property that a sensiblydefined vertex nomination scheme should view all vertices in a given I g (u) as being equally "interesting" in G 2 . These vertices are topologically indistinguishable, and thus are only separated by their labels which have been obfuscated via o. Truely obfuscated vertex labels should be independent of the obfuscation function, and the consistency criterion requires that the set of ranks of each set of equivalent vertices (i.e., each I g 2 (u)) does not depend on the particular choice of obfuscation function.
A VN scheme is an information retrieval tool for efficiently querying large network data sets. Rather than naively searching G 2 for interesting vertices, an appropriate VN scheme provides a rank list of the vertices in G 2 that, ideally, allows users to identify v.o.i. in G 2 in a time-efficient manner. As such, to measure the performance of a VN scheme, we will adopt a recall-at-k/precision-at-k framework. More precisely, we have Definition 6. Let Φ ∈ V n,m be a vertex nomination scheme, W an obfuscating set,
, we define the level-k nomination losses via
The error of a VN scheme is then defined as the expected loss. To wit, we have Definition 7. Let Φ ∈ V n,m be a vertex nomination scheme, W an obfuscating set,
The level-k Bayes optimal scheme is defined as any element
In the absence of symmetries amongst the vertices in V * (i.e., I(v, G 2 ) = {v} for all v ∈ V * ), the derivation of the Bayes optimal scheme in the present |V * | > 1 setting mimics that of the |V * | = 1 setting presented in [26] . See Appendix A for full detail. Bayes optimal schemes when symmetries exist for the v.o.i., i.e. |I(v, ; g 2 )| > 1, offer additional complications and, in the case when |V * | = 1 done in [26] , little additional insight. Precisely defining the Bayes optimal scheme in the case of symmetries when |V * | > 1 is notationally and technically nontrivial, and is the subject of current research. Consistency in the VN framework is then defined as follows.
be a sequence of distributions in N . We say that F has nested cores if there exists an n 1 such that for all n 1 ≤ n < n ,
, we have, letting C and C be the core vertices associated with F (n,mn) cn,θn and F (n ,m n ) c n ,θ n respectively, and denoting the junk
iii. C ⊂ C .
cn,θn ) n=∞ n=n 0 be a sequence of nominatable distributions in N with nested cores satisfying lim n→∞ m n = ∞. For a given non-decreasing sequence
for any sequence of obfuscating functions of V 2 with |V 2 | = m n .
ii. level-(k n ) precision consistent for for nested V * n ∈ C n with respect to F if
We say that a VN rule Φ is universally level-(k n )
consistent for all nested-core nominatable sequences F. Corollary 19 from [26] proves that universally consistent VN schemes do not exist for any nondecreasing integral sequences (k n ) satisfying k n = o(m n ) and any (V * n ) satisfying |V * n | = Θ(1). Beyond the ramifications for practically implementing VN in streaming or evolving network environments considered in [26] , this lack of universal consistency is also the motivating result for our statistical approach to adversarial contamination in VN. Indeed, a simple consequence of the lack of universal consistency is that for any VN rule there are nominatable sequences for which the rule is not consistent. An adversary could then be understood as a probabilistic mechanism designed to transform nominatable sequences for which the rule is consistent into nominatable sequences for which the rule is not consistent.
To develop this reasoning further, we next develop the notion of (maximal) consistency classes in the VN framework.
VN Consistency Classes
We next explore the concept of consistency classes in VN, with an eye towards the development of a statistical adversarial contamination framework for VN. First, let N V * be the collection of all nested-core nominatable sequences with nested v.o.i.
, and nondecreasing sequence (k n ) (satisfying the growth conditions of Lemma 11), the level-
consistency class of Φ is defined to be
The lack of universal consistency ensures that C
It is natural to ask if there are a finite number of VN rules
An affirmative answer would allow for ensemble methods to practically overcome the lack of universally consistent rules, and hence practically overcome any adversarial attack in the VN framework. We will see in Section 2.1.1 that the answer is, as expected, no, and any partition of N V * into maximal consistency classes necessarily contains infinite parts; see Lemma 11. As a consequence, ensemble methods cannot recover universal consistency in VN. The insights developed in Section 2.1.1 further motivate the development of adversarial contamination regimes for a given rule Φ.
The idea behind adversarial contamination is simple in this framework: the adversary
Φ .
Counting Consistency Classes
How can a practitioner mitigate the impact of a lack of universal consistency? One idea would be to consider ensemble methods, as the practical implications of the lack of universal consistency can be mitigated if universally consistent ensemble schemes exist.
In this section, we will formalize the notion of maximal VN consistency classes and prove that infinitely many maximal consistency classes exist. We begin with defining the notion of maximal consistency classes in the VN-framework.
Definition 10. As above, let N V * be the collection of all nested-core nominatable sequences with nested v.o.i. V * = (V * n ⊂ C n ). For a nondecreasing integer sequence (k n ), we say that C ∈ N V * is a maximal level-(k n ) precision recall consistency class for V * if the following two conditions hold.
i. There exists a VN rule Φ that is jointly level-(k n ) precision recall consistent for V * for each F ∈ C;
ii. If F / ∈ C, then there does not exist a VN rule Φ that is jointly level-(k n ) precision recall consistent for V * for each F ∈ C ∪ {F }.
A natural question to ask is whether it is possible to partition N V * into a finite number of maximal level-(k n ) consistency classes for a particular sequence (k n ) ∞ n=1 ? Our next result-Lemma 11-shows that for any integer sequence (k n ) satisfying a modest growth condition, any partition of N into maximal level-(k n ) consistency classes must include at least countably infinite parts, thus erasing the hope that ensemble methods can recover universal consistency and practically mitigate the effect of any VN adversarial attack.
Lemma 11. Let (k n ) be a sequence of nondecreasing integers satisfying k n = o(n), and let V * be a nested sequence of vertices of interest satisfying |V * n | = Θ(1).
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B
Verification functions
In the presence of an adversarial attack, is it possible to, without additional supervision, verify if a given VN scheme is working on a given F (n,m) c,θ ∈ N n,m ? In other words, given a nondecreasing integer sequence (k n ), (g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ G n × G m , and v.o.i. V * n , can we consistently estimate the verification function
Note that the scaling by |V * n | in the recall setting and by k n in the precision setting do not affect consistent estimation of h given |V * n | = Θ(1) and in the precision setting k n = Θ(1). As such, the scaling is omitted.
The internal consistency criterion, Eq. 1 guarantees that
for all obfuscation functions o n ,õ n ∈ O n . Indeed, the v.o.i.'s in g 2 are identical (though obfuscated differently) in o n (g 2 ) andõ n (g 2 ). If we consider an alternate (g 1 , g 2 ) ∼
F n ⊂ F , it could be the case that
Consider the problem of estimating h Φn viaĥ Φn . If the estimator is label-agnostic (i.e., there is no information in the obfuscated labeling of o(g 2 )), then it is sensible to require that for all g 2 ≈ g 2 , we have that
Contrasting this to Eq. (2), we see that (ĥ Φn ) cannot universally consistently estimate Lemma 12. With notation as above, let (ĥ Φn ) n be any sequence of label-agnostic (i.e., satisfying Eq. 3) estimators of (h Φn ) n . There exists sequences of nested-core nominatable distributions F = (F n ) and F = (F n ) such that for n sufficiently large, if
As a result of the above discussion and Lemma, we are unable to verify, without additional supervision, if an adversary has moved the distribution out of a given VN rule's consistency class. This points to the primacy of additional supervision, which in the VN framework often comes in the form of a user-in-the-loop. Indeed, we are currently exploring the role/impact a use-in-the-loop in VN-where the user can evaluate the interestingness of the vertices in the top k of the nomination list for a cost c k . This supervision can also be thought of as a form of regularization, designed to increase the consistency class of a given VN rule.
Adversarial Vertex Nomination
In order to actively model adversarial attacks in the VN-framework, we formalize the notion of an edge adversary.
Definition 13. Let F be a distribution on graphs in G m , and let U be a random variable independent of G ∼ F . We say A = {f A , V A , U, θ} is an adversary parameterized by
where ∆ represents the symmetric difference) then K ⊂ V A (G, U, θ). Succinctly put, if an edge is added or removed from E(G), then the vertices adjacent to that edge must be in
In the above, U represents an independent source of randomness utilized in the adversarial attack.
Note that f A is simply a function that adds/deletes edges from a network potentially randomly, and these edges must be incident to the vertices of V A . To that end, we will refer to V A as the vertices contaminated by A.
If we are given a sequence of nominatable distributions F = (F n ) ∞ n=n 0 , where F n is a distribution on G n × G m , then we will let f An (F n ) denote a sequence of graphs realized from F n , with the second graph G 2 contaminated by f An ; we call a sequence (f An ) ∞ n=n 0 an adversary rule. In the language of VN consistency classes, we posit that an adversary rule aims to contaminate a VN rule Φ via
Remark 14. Let G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 ) and G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 ). Consider an edge adversary f A acting on G 2 . By considering V 2 = V (G 2 ) \ V A , we can also consider this adversary as a vertex adversary that randomly adds vertices to G 2 . Vertex addition and deletion can be simultaneously modeled by first considering a mechanism for randomly deleting vertices from G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 ) before using the above approach to add adversarial vertices to the network.
Remark 15. In [50] , the authors consider direct attacks and influencer attacks in which, given a vertex of interest v * , either v * ∈ V A or v * / ∈ V A respectively. However, note that in [50] , the objective is vertex classification, whereas we are not directly classifying vertices. Rather, we are interested in ranking vertices in G 2 by interestingness given limited training data in G 1 . We will typically assume that v * / ∈ V A (i.e. the adversary does not control the vertex of interest), so that we are examining influencer attacks.
A Simple VN Adversarial Contamination Model
Now that we have developed the requisite theory for framing the idea of adversarial contamination in the VN-setting, we will consider a simple model for adversarial contamination in the stochastic blockmodel (SBM) of [22] . iii. The block probability matrix B ∈ [0, 1] K×K is such that, for each pair of vertices
, and the collection of indicator random variables {1 u∼ G v } {u,v}∈( V 2 ) is mutually independent (here {u ∼ G v} ⇔ {{u, v} ∈ E}).
In addition, we will say that a pair of graphs (G 1 , G 2 ) is an instantiation of a ρ- K, B, b) , and the collection of indicator random variables
Consider G as an n-vertex stochastic blockmodel, with two blocks, B 1 and B 2 , and with π = (1/2, 1/2) . The block-probability matrix B is given by
with p ≥ q ≥ r > 0. Given G = g, we define the following VN adversarial contamination procedure A = (f A , V A , U, θ) acting on g as follows: 2. U is a uniformly distributed random variable independent of G;
3. f A (g, U, θ) ∈ G n is defined as follows:
i. Initialize g c = g
ii. Independently select vertices from V = [n] with probability π + (call them W + ). Then, independently select vertices V \ W + with probability π − (call then W − ).
iii. For each vertex pair {v, u} ∈ W + × (V \ W − ), i. If {v, u} ∈ E(g c ), nothing happens.
ii. If {v, u} / ∈ E(g c ), an edge is independently added connecting {v, u} in g c with probability s + .
iv. For each vertex pair {v,
ii. If {v, u} ∈ E(g c ), the edge is independently deleted from g c with proba-
The auxiliary randomness U in A is utilized to make the random vertex selections in ii., the random edge additions in iii., and the random edge deletions in iv.
Notice that this adversarial model gives rise to a new stochastic blockmodel with the edge-probability matrixB given bỹ
where [8] .
Note also that the original block structure is preserved amongst vertices inB 1 ∪B 2 , and we can view this contamination model as adding vertices randomly to G[B 1 ∪B 2 ], i.e., the induced subgraph onB 1 ∪B 2 . When (G 1 , G 2 ) ∼ SBM(ρ, n, K, B, π) and this adversarial procedure is applied to G 2 , we will denote
Remark 17. Let A n be the simple adversarial rule outlined above. A very simple VN rule Φ and nested core nominatable sequence F for which
proceeds as follows. Consider F n = SBM(ρ, n, K, B, π) supported on G n × G n where B is as in Eq. 4 with π = (1/2, 1/2), p > q > r fixed, and ρ > 0 fixed. Suppose that Φ n is a VN scheme that runs spectral clustering on the contaminated graph by first selecting the number of communities in a consistent manner (via adjacency spectral clustering for example [27] ) and ranking all the vertices in the group with the highest probability of within-group connection (in a fixed but arbitrary order), and then ranks the rest of the vertices in fixed but arbitrary order. Suppose that we consider k n = n/2. It is
and that the adversary acting on G 2 impacts this consistency. Indeed, if either
2.
then Φ n is no longer consistent with respect to the adversarially contaminated model sequence.
VN via ASE o GMM
In the contamination model of Section 3.1, we consider the following VN scheme,
) be the vertex (resp., vertices) of interest in G 1 , we seek the corresponding vertex (resp., vertices) of interest in V (G 2 ) as follows:
1. Given two graphs, G 1 and G 2 , we use Adjacency Spectral Embedding (ASE) [43] to separately embed G 1 and G 2 into a common Euclidean space R d . Given the n × n adjacency matrix A of G 1 , the d-dimensional ASE of G 1 is defined as follows.
Definition 18 (Adjacency spectral embedding (ASE)). Given d ∈ Z > 0, the adja-
A where
is the spectral decomposition of |A| = (A T A) 1/2 , S A ∈ R d×d is the diagonal matrix with the d largest eigenvalues of |A| on its diagonal and U A ∈ R n×d has columns which are the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues of S A .
Simply stated, the ASE of a graph G provides Euclidean features for each vertex in G on which to perform subsequent inference. Combined with recent efforts to prove that the ASE provides consistent estimators of the latent position parameters in random dot product graphs and positive-definite stochastic blockmodels [43, 2] , the ASE allows for a host classical inference methodologies to be successfully employed within these random graph frameworks [44, 45, 28] . To choose d above, we use the machinery of [49, 9] to develop the principled heuristic of estimating d as the larger of the two elbows of the associated scree plots of the singular values of G 1 and G 2 .
2.
Solve the orthogonal Procrustes problem [39] to find an orthogonal transformation aligning the seeded vertices across graphs. Let X S (resp., Y S ) be the matrix composed of the rows of ASE(G 1 ) (resp., ASE(G 2 )) corresponding to the seeded vertices in S.
Letting the SVD of Y T S X S = U ΣV T , the solution to
is given by R = U V T . Use this transformation to align the embeddings of
3. Motivated by the central limit theorem of [3] for the residual errors between the rows of the ASE and the latent position parameters in random dot product graphs, we use model-based Gaussian mixture modeling (GMM) to simultaneously cluster the vertices of the embedded graphs. Here, we employ the R package MClust [18] .
4.
Rank the candidate matches in G 2 according to the following heuristic. If u ∈ V (G 1 ) and v ∈ V (G 2 ) are clustered points in the Procrustes-aligned embedding of G 1 and G 2 with respective covariance matrices Σ u and Σ v in their components of the GMM, then
are the respective Mahalanobis distances from u to v. In the case of a single v.o.i. v * , rank the vertices in G 2 then by increasing value of ∆(v * , u), i.e., with ties broken in a fixed deterministic fashion, we rank via (where n 2 = |V (G 2 )|)
. . .
In the case of multiple v.o.i. V * , rank the vertices in G 2 then by increasing value of min v∈V * ∆(v, u) with ties broken in a fixed deterministic fashion.
Simulation
We consider the model in Section 3.1 with the following parameter choices: Note that, in the notation of Section 3.1, if (G 1 , G 2 ) ∼ SBM(ρ, n, K, B, π), we will consider In this simulation example, we observe that the adversarial contamination model significantly decreases VN performance and that the trimming regularization mitigates this contamination and recovers much of the lost inferential performance.
In Figure 4 we plot the performance of VN • GMM • ASE over a number of (x, y) trimming pairs (we note that for all correlation/regularized/contaminated/trimmed combinations, mean performance is significantly better than chance and chance normalized plots are omitted). In the left panel, we plot the modularity of the GMM clustering in the trimmed G ). We see here that, as expected, performance loss due to contamination is mitigated by using the true model-based trimming parameters x = y = 0.1, and using the modularity maximizing x = 0.1, y = 0. If we over-trim, here represented by x = y = 0.2, we see a degradation in performance; as expected from the low modularity value in the left panel for x = y = 0.2. We again see here the interesting phenomena observed in the motivating high school friendship network example of Section 1.1: modularity and subsequently VN performance tends to emphasize more trimming of the low degree vertices and less trimming of the high degree vertices. This suggests that low-degree contamination is most effective at thwarting the performance on VN • GMM • ASE, perhaps contrary to the intuition that high-degree nodes adversely affect concentration of adjacency matrices [24] .
As in our motivating example, trimming can have the effect of removing v.o.i. from Affect of regularization on VN o GMM o ASE; rho=0.7 ); and the pink line for (G
).
of ρ on VN • GMM • ASE performance, we repeat the above experiment with ρ = 0.5, and ρ = 0.3. Results are plotted in Figure 5 . As expected, the trends observed in Figure   4 hold here as well, with an across the board performance decrease as ρ decreases.
Microsoft Bing Entity Graph Transitions
In the next example, we consider a multigraph derived from one month of aggregate Bing entity graph transitions. The multigraph represents entity transitions, and each weighted edge-type of the multigraph represents aggregated signal that capture a transition rate between two entities while browsing. There are multiple ways that a transition between those entities could be made, so we count each aggregated signal separately using the different edge-types in the multigraph: one edge-type represents transitions that were made via a suggestion interface; the other edge-type represents transitions that we made independent of any suggestion interface. As such, one type will have a constrained set of transition probabilities (it can realistically only connect to a subset of the vertices in the graph), while the other will be more "unlimited" in that it may connect to any other entity in the entire graph.
The resulting graphs are symmetric, weighted and loop-free, with G 
2 ) (yellow line), on (G
2 ) (red line), on (G 1 . In Figure 7 , we explore the effect of this contamination (and the subsequent regularization) on VN • GMM • ASE.
Considering two randomly chosen sets of s = 100 seeds, we run VN
2 ) (yellow line in Figure 7 ), on (G has 36808 vertices, and as expected, absolute performance (the left panel in Figure 7 ) in the clean case is better than in the regularized setting. From the right panel, we observe however, that the relative improvement over chance achieved in the regularized setting exceeds that in the clean setting, and we observe that VN • GMM • ASE performance is worse than chance in the contaminated and over-regularized network settings. While regularization has not recovered the performance in the idealized setting, the improvement induced via regularization is dramatic versus the contaminated setting. We also note that the modularity levels for automating the choice of (x, y) in this example are relatively stable Reg. x=0, y=0.5
Reg. x=0.5, y=0
Affect of regularization on VN o GMM o ASE 
2 ) (red line), on (G
) (green line); and on (G to the trimming value, with the clustered G 
Discussion
Our motivating question is two-fold: What effect does adversarial contamination have on the performance of vertex nomination; and can (statistically) successful vertex nomination be retained in the presence or absence of unmatchable vertices? Herein, we have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that an adversary can cause our VN scheme to fail (i.e., nominate the wrong vertices). Empirically, we have also demonstrated that regularization can be effective for mitigating the effect of the contamination model posited herein. Establishing the theoretical effect of regularization on VN is an open problem, and the subject of our present research.
In [26] , the authors showed that there can be no universally consistent vertex nomination scheme assuming only one vertex of interest. In this paper, we have seen that with a suitable definition of a maximal consistency class and (possibly) multiple vertices of interest, there are infinitely many such consistency classes, which implies that ensemble methods cannot recover consistency and/or thwart an arbitrary adver- Our proposed definition of an adversary is suited to a general random graph setting, and it provides a simple surrogate in which to study the effect of contamination in real data examples. From our simulation study and real data examples we have seen that a particular VN rule (VN • GMM • ASE) succeeds before adversarial contamination, fails after contamination, and succeeds after graph regularization. We are currently exploring the effect of contamination on a broader class of VN rules, and considering other models for adversarial contamination and subsequent regularization. Finally, while we have partially answered in the negative our question about whether consistency can be retained in the general adversarial setting, another valid consideration is whether there are adversarial models for which the adversary does not affect consistency. While we believe even simple manipulation on the edges of G 2 can affect consistency, it may be possible to derive bounds and phase transitions on the number of edges (or vertices) that an adversary would need to modify to change the result. 
A Construction of the Bayes optimal scheme
Given the notation of Section 2, we now develop the Bayes optimal nomination scheme.
Let n, m be fixed and let V * ⊂ V 1 ∩ V 2 be fixed. Let W be an obfuscating set and o ∈ O W . Define G a n × G a m to be the set of graphs
where denotes graph isomorphism. For each w ∈ W and u ∈ V 2 , we also define the following restriction
Choose graphs
so that the sets
partition G a n × G a m . To ease notation, we will denote this partition via P 
2 )])
For each element
2 )},
2 )), and define
2 ), V * )).
2 )) = o(g 2 ) and
2 )]
Note that, by definition, p Φ * majorizes p Φ .
To show that Φ * is Bayes optimal for L (1) k (the proof for L (2) k being completely analogous), we have that for k ≤ m − 1, 2 )]
as desired.
B Proof of Lemma 11
We first note that the growth condition on |V * n | and on k n in the precision case ensures that the result for precision and recall consistency follow from each other, and so we will focus our attention on recall consistency. The analogous result for precision follows mutatis mutandis. of B i+1 with {iξ n + 1, iξ n + 2, iξ n + 3, · · · , (i + 1)ξ n };
. . . of B n/3 ξn with n/3 ξ n − 1 ξ n + 1, n/3 ξ n − 1 ξ n + 2, · · · , n/3 ξ n ξ n ; of H n with n/3 ξ n ξ n + 1, n/3 ξ n ξ n + 2, . . . , n .
For each ∈ n/3 ξn and each vertex v in V (B ), independent of all other edges in the network, select vertices uniformly at random from H n , i.e., from n/3 ξ n ξ n + 1, n/3 ξ n ξ n + 2, . . . , n .
Denote this set of vertices via V v, -and place an edge between v and each vertex in V v, . Let H n,i be the collection of all graphs possible under the above construction, and let F n,i be the distribution on H n,i outlined above.
With c = n, the correspondence the identity, and (where
, define the collection of nominatable distributions F n,i n/3 ξn i=1 via F n,i = F n,1 × F n,i (where "×" denotes the usual product measure).
Suppose a VN rule Φ = (Φ n ) ∞ n=n 0 is level-(k n ) recall consistent for
kn (V * , F n,i ) = 0.
However, note that here
Indeed, for a given F n,i , consider the following VN scheme Ψ n . First identify the vertices of H n ; this is possible as H n is a complete subgraph of order ≥ 2n/3, and each B i is of order o(n) with vertices of degree at most n/3 ξn ≤ n/3. Each B can then be recovered and identified by computing the number of edges between H n and each vertex v ∈ V \ V (H n ); in particular B i can be identified as the set of vertices in V \ V (H n ) with i edges to V (H n ). Let ψ n then rank the vertices in B i (in arbitrary order) at the top of its nomination list. It is immediate then that
By the distributional symmetry of the v.o.i., we have that for v ∈ V * ,
kn (Φ n , V * ).
For any > 0 and sufficiently large n, consistency ensures that
The internal consistency criterion in the definition of VN schemes (Eq. 1), then implies that
for each v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ξ n }. Now, suppose that Φ is also level-k n recall consistent for F j for j = i. By similar logic, we must have that
for each v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ξ n } for sufficiently large n.
Let σ i↔j be the permutation on {1, .., n} defined as By consistency with respect toF n,i andF n,j , i.e., by Eqs. 8-9, we have that for any > 0, there existsñ such that for n ≥ñ, we have
As (G 1 , G 2 ) ∼ F n,i ⇔ (G 1 , σ(G 2 )) ∼ F n,j , the internal consistency criterion (Eq. 1) of a VN scheme then implies that
Now, for each v ∈ [ξ n ] and h ∈ [k n ] define α v,h =P F n,i (g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ H n,1 × H n,i : rank Φn(g 1 ,o(g 2 ),V * n ) (o(v)) = h R i,v,h β v,h =P F n,i (g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ H n,1 × H n,i : rank P F n,i (R i,v,h ) + P F n,i (S i,v,h ) = ξ n α v,h + ξ n β v,h , and hence
Plugging this into Eq. 11 then yields k n ξ n − ≤= P F n,i (B As was chosen arbitrarily, and kn ξn is bounded away from 0 by assumption, we reach our desired contradiction, and Φ cannot be consistent with respect to both F i and F j .
As i, j ∈ n 0 /3 ξn 0 were arbitrary, we see that there must be at least countably many consistency classes (since there are at least n 0 /3 ξn 0 and we can let n 0 tend to infinity).
